Abstract: A supply network design problem is addressed under a price elastic demand from the market. It is formulated as a biform game, combining a strategic subgame with a cooperative subgame. The cooperative subgame has a quadratic objective function. The results of this game are the winning coalition of manufacturing firms and the payoff profile associated with it. The proposed payoff allocation policy is shown to be fair, efficient and individually rational. Coalitional stability is conditioned on the game convexity, which is not always verified. Global profit optimality is obtained if the manufacturing network is directly facing the market. In the presence of an autonomous retailer between the manufacturing network and the market, the supply chain output is not globally optimal any more.
INTRODUCTION
One of the main achievements of the European coordinated action CODESNET (Villa et al. 2009 ), has been to identify different types of associations implemented among the european firms, and specially SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises), confronting rough competition and the effects of globalization. Two main types of business agreements have been observed: buyer-supplier contracts and resource sharing contracts. Networks of firms connected by contracts of the first type, generally constitute market driven supply networks with complementary skills and products. On the contrary, contracts of the second type often connect firms with similar activity and capability, trying to exchange experience and practice on the use of modern information and management tools. Typical examples of such associations can be found in the so-called "districts" of northern Italy (Villa et al. 2009 ).
In fact, firms facing hazardous environment are strongly motivated to combine their strengths and compensate for their weaknesses. The sharing of resources appears a key approach for increasing efficiency, both globally and individually. Actually, the types of network created mainly differ by the types of resources shared: manufacturing equipment in the first case, information systems in the second case. Based on this unifying assertion, this study proposes to represent an association of firms as a coalition able to generate the largest profit and to distribute it in a fair manner that is, at least, providing its members with a greater income than when he was alone. In terms of cooperative game theory (see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) , these properties are called optimality, efficiency and individual rationality. From a theoretical viewpoint, stability of a coalition requires the stronger property of (global) rationality. This study presents a supply network that consists of a price reactive market, a retailer and a manufacturing network. It is shown that the proposed profit sharing policy exhibits the properties of efficiency, fairness and individual rationality, but that, in general, it does not guarantee global rationality. Policies that are both efficient and globally rational are said to belong to the "core" of the game. Implementation of a core allocation policy is a necessary condition to guarantee coalitional stability. But fairness is also a key property het determines the acceptability of an allocation policy. Then, the so-called "game convexity" property is presented as a necessary condition to guarantee both stability and fairness. It is also shown that global optimality of the supply network can be obtained only if the supply network is directly facing the market. The presence of an autonomous retailer as an intermediate actor between the market and the manufacturing network tends to decrease the global efficiency of the supply network.
MANUFACTURING NETWORK OPTIMIZATION UNDER VARIABLE PRICES
The paper analyzes the issue of supply network formation under price elastic demands for final products. This problem can be interpreted as a biform game that combines a strategic game between a manufacturers' network and the market, and a cooperative game within the manufacturing network. Biform games have been introduced by Brandenburger and Stuart (2007) to describe business situations that combine strategic decisions and cooperative agreements.
In particular, this hybrid model has been adopted in the SCM (Supply Chain Management) literature. In this context, several authors (Anupindi et al. (2001) , Plambeck and Taylor (2005) Chatain and Zemsky (2007) ) have defined games composed of two stages, the first one being strategic and the second one cooperative. In this paper, the two stages are integrated through a Stackelberg mechanism in which the manufacturing network decision anticipates the market reaction function.
In the strategic subgame, the manufacturing network is supposed to dominate the retailer, who acts as a Stackelberg follower. The consumers' optimization problem then determines the quantities purchased to the retailer as functions of market prices. Integration of the retailer's decisions and the market reaction function in the manufacturers' profit function generates a quadratic production game not yet studied in the literature.
Two versions of this game are studied in the paper. The first version includes a retailer who acts as an intermediate player between the manufacturing network and the market. In the second version, the manufacturing network also plays the role of a retailer by directly selling its products on the market.
2.1
The market game Consider a retailer selling on a market a set of products numbered i=1,…,n. He buys the products to the manufacturing network who fixes the vector of unit wholesale prices , … . . , .
In the market game between the retailer and the set of customers, the retailer plays first, by proposing a price vector , … . . , and the market reacts by buying a quantity that depends on this price and on its habits and requirements.
The supply-demand negotiation game can be represented as an iterative process. For each final product sold on the market, the retailer faces a stochastic demand. The current price ) (t p i is the decision variable fixed by the retailer and the currently purchased quantity, ) (t y i ,is the decision variable of the market. Different models of the market reaction function can be investigated. Let (t) Y i and (t) P i be the vectors of present and past quantities and prices purchased by customers at periods t,t-1, t-2,…t-h+1, with h the system memory, supposed finite. In a generic manner, we write:
. For each product i=1,…,n, the market game is supposed to reach a stable equilibrium for which the expected quantity i y sold over a reference period, satisfies:
be the expected equilibrium output vector of products during a reference period. Equation (1) is called the (expected) demand curve. As in Lariviere and Porteus (2001) , the retailer faces the inverse demand curve directly derived from (1) and corresponding to the equilibrium optimality conditions of the market game. The products being assumed independent, the inverse demand curve for each product i=1,…,n is:
Quantities and prices being nonnegative, a necessary condition for equations (2) to be valid is :
Considering the price-dependent expected quantity sold, i y for i=1,…,n, the expected profit of the retailer over the reference period is :
The price vector, is obtained from (2) in the form: The objective is to find the optimal vector that maximize ∏ , with:
The optimality condition takes the following form:
Preprints of the 18th IFAC World Congress
And since 0, the criterion is strictly concave and admits a single optimal solution. For each product, the optimal expected demand is:
The non negativity of this quantity derives from inequalities (3) and (4). Accordingly, the proposed retail price is derived from (2):
The retailer's problem
It is now assumed that the vector of wholesale prices, w, is imposed to the retailer by the manufacturer's network, who acts as a Stackelberg leader. It is related to the output vector y, by:
Then, as a Stackelberg follower, the retailer reacts by choosing the retail prices (9) that maximize his expected profit. From (3), (9), (10), the retailer expected profit is: Under a wholesale price contracts, the coalition of manufacturers acts as the Stackelberg leader by fixing the wholesale price vector w as a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. As the follower, the retailer can only accept or reject the manufacturers' proposal. It is assumed that the retailer agrees to conclude any contract, provided that he obtains an expected profit greater than his opportunity cost, which is set equal to zero by convention. After the manufacturers network has set the vector of wholesale prices, w, the retailer determines p (or equivalently ) to maximize his expected profit. Having anticipated the retailer's reaction function (5), the coalition determines to maximize his expected profit. The pair of optimal vectors , can thus be determined by the manufacturers' network.
The manufacturers' game
At the manufacturing stage, two different problems must be solved: the strategic problem of selecting the wholesale price vector w, and the cooperative problem of optimizing the production vector y and the coalition characteristic vector .
S e
The profit optimization problem can be formulated as follows:
For a given vector w, problem (14) characterizes a cooperative game, namely the Linear Production Game (LPG) studied in Owen (1975) , Van Gellekom et al. (2000) and Hennet and Mahjoub (2010) . In the biform game studied in this paper, variables are decision variables with optimal values related to the optimal output values through relations (10).
By substituting equations (10) into the objective function of problem (14), we obtain a set of quadratic programming problems (P) that defines a quadratic production game.
3. THE QUADRATIC PRODUCTION GAME By assuming exogenous prices imposed by the market, the LPG describes a competitive economic situation. On the contrary, the quadratic production game (QPG) described in this paper is more appropriate to describe an oligopolistic situation in which the manufacturing network imposes its decisions to the retailer who himself has a dominant position over customers and imposes the retail prices. In this context, the QPG addresses the three following issues:
(1) the profit maximization problem for the manufacturing network considered as a whole, (2) the coalition decision problem through the choice of vector S e , (3) the problem of profit allocation to the members of the optimal coalition.
Manufacturing profit maximization
Consider a coalition S, 
Formally, problem (P S ) is similar to problem (P), except for the fact that in problem (P), is a vector of decision variables, while in problem (P S ), vector is the fixed characteristic vector of the investigated coalition, S. The following result can be derived from the comparison of problems (P S ) for different coalitions N S  . The optimal solution of problem (P S ), denoted ) (S v , is obtained for the output vector denoted . and Be S Be N . Then, the optimal solution of (P S ) is feasible for (P N ) and the maximal expected profit can be obtained as the optimal solution of (P N ).
The global profit maximization problem can thus be solved through solving (P N ) instead of (P), with the advantage of solving a problem in which all the variables are continuous.
It can be noticed that property 3.1 does not imply optimality of the grand coalition is the sense of the following definition:
Definition 3.2 Coalition optimality
The optimal cardinality of the TU-game
For Quadratic Production Games, as well as for Linear Production Games (Hennet and Mahjoub, 2010) , it may happen that some coalitions with a smaller cardinality than N also yield the optimal expected profit.
Profit allocation in a coalition
It is desirable to relate profit allocations of players to their marginal contribution to the value function. Classically (see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) , the marginal contribution of player i to coalition N  S with S i  is defined by:
( 1 5 ) A particular allocation policy, introduced by Shapley (1953) has been shown to possess the best properties in terms of fairness. It is called the Shapley value, and defined by:
for each i in N where R is the set of all N! orderings of N , and ) (r S i is the set of players preceding i in the ordering r.
To study the stability properties of the Shapley value allocation, the notions of core and game convexity are now introduced.
Definition 3.3 Core
The core of a cooperative game is the set of feasible payoff profiles
that are both efficient (Pareto optimal) (condition (17)) and rational (condition (18)):
As in Gillies (1959) , core allocations can be considered stable since they constitute: "the set of feasible outcomes that cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players".
Definition 3.4 Convexity
A cooperative game is convex if and only if:
The following result applies (Shapley, 1971) :
Property 3.5 If a cooperative game is convex, the Shapley value allocation is in the core.
Unfortunately, convexity is not guaranteed in general for the QPG, as illustrated in the following counter-example. It is thus necessary to differentiate coalitional rationality (not verified in general) from individual rationality.
Finally, the manufacturers' game can be solved in a fair, efficient and individually rational manner through the following steps:
(1) Solve problem ( N P ) to obtain the maximal profit and the optimal output vector y, (2) Set the wholesale price vector w computed by (10), (3) Compute the Shapley value allocation (16) to allocate the expected profit among the partners.
Computation of the Shapley value allocation requires computing the solution of all the problems (P S ) for N  S , and this, of course, can be very time consuming for large sets of manufacturing partners.
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN OPTIMALITY
The problem of globally optimizing the expected profit of the supply chain can be written as follows: 
This problem is exactly formulated as the manufacturing production game in which the manufacturing network also plays the role of the retailer by directly selling the products on the market:
Maximize ∏ ∑ Subject to , 0,1 .
(P')
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Note that problem (P') differs from problem (P) only by the coefficient of the quadratic term in the criterion. Again, the maximal profit value is obtained in particular for the grand coalition, N . The global optimal profit of the supply network is the optimum of problem (P' N ), obtained by replacing in (P') by 1  N e .
The manufacturing network generates the maximal global profit and captures it entirely if it also plays the role of the retailer with respect to the market. If the retailer is a different and autonomous body, then, the global supply chain profit is smaller than the optimal one because the optimal output y for problem (P) differs from the optimal one, y*, that solves problem (P'). Furthermore, even if the manufacturing network acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the retailer, the manufacturing network is unable to capture the expected profit of the retailer, which is always given by (11):
